The court can protect itself against sham sales cf. The section provides a very useful summary method of determining between husband and wife questions of title and the right to possession of property. There are some complications regarding Mr. Such a case bears no relation to the present. The town is located 24 mi east of the county town of Lewes and 53 mi south east of London, and has an population of 90,254. Not every case, nor necessarily the majority of cases, are such as the present where the desertion is clear and uncontestable: yet where it is not, how can a third party, seeking to take a title to the property, be expected to involve himself in these matrimonial complications? The house was charged by the husband to the Appellant bank in July, 1958, and in April, 1960, a preceding charge in favour of a Building Society was discharged as a result of which the Appellant became the sole chargee. On the Kings behalf, the Lord Chancellor developed a parallel system in the Court of Chancery.
Lord Wilberforce offered a definition of property rights, however this level of the decision was compromised, and forms heavily amended principles of law, as the concept of the constructive trust was developed further. The wife resisted saying that she had an overriding. The test, on the question whether the deserted wife has a right to remain in occupation of the premises must, as the Court of Appeal thought, be whether she has something affecting the title to the land, of the nature of a real right, in which case the land would be bound in the hands of the trustee, or whether, on the other hand, she merely has certain in personam claims against her husband. Maudsley for his article on Licence to Remain on Land other than a Wife's Licence 20 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, N. In November, 1959, the husband raised from the Appellant nearly £6,000 secured by a mortgage on 124, Milward Road, 7, Bank Buildings, Hastings where he carried on business as a car dealer and a second mortgage on 13, Devonshire Road where his mother lived and he himself went to live on leaving the Respondent. After William the Conqueror became King in 1066, one law of England was created.
I refer to page 657 of his judgment in which he pointed out that the obligation, though relating to the use of land, was a personal obligation and quoted from the judgment of Collins L. For example, a purchaser takes subject to the rights of a tenant in possession whatever they may be. I may refer to Shipman v. It may not be the only conduct from which the court will infer the necessary agreement. The Royal Commission on Divorce called attention to this point see Com- mand 1956—No.
Evaluation Despite the fact that Mrs Rosset argued she had an overriding interest under the Land Registration Act 1925 s. He certainly cannot revoke it on his desertion. Much has been written about it and I would express my gratitude to Professor Cheshire for his lecture on a New Equitable Interest in Land 16 Modern Law Review 1 , to Professor Sheridan for his article on Licences to Live in Houses 17 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, N. In addition to section 17 of the Act of 1882 section 12 of the same Act now repealed which gave remedies to a married woman for the protection of her separate property was used so as to pronounce in effect a separation against a husband who had treated his wife badly for he was restrained from entering the home which was the wife's separate property. The common law courts have, of course, for centuries protected a licence coupled with an interest. She had a right to stay there unless and until the court ordered her out. The position as it now stands is that the Court of Appeal, reversing in this respect the decision of Cross J.
Thus, both proprietary estoppel and the family home constructive trust has move away from the in personam right not trumping an in rem right. They have done this by the device of holding that the husband-tenant cannot put an end to the tenancy, even by such acts as delivering the keys to the landlord, so long as his wife remains on the premises: he remains there by her, and so long as he does so, whatever else he does or says, the tenancy remains. I have already pointed out that before desertion she has no special rights in the particular house where the spouses are living and I cannot see why on principle any better rights should arise on desertion. He could only apply for possession under section 17 of the ; and under that section the court had a discretion whether to order her out or not: see H v H. Proceedings are available under section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, which enables questions between husband and wife to be decided in a summary way. It has been suggested that those cases turned on the fact that there was a collusive arrangement between husband and purchaser. The Rent Restriction cases, however, give no help to the consideration of the problem of the nature of the wife's occupation when deserted by her husband in other cases.
Is it an incumbrance which must be registered under the? On- the other hand, there is no reason why the wife should be in a better position if her husband becomes bankrupt after leaving her than she would have been if his bankruptcy had taken place while they were living together. Lee supra and Churcher v. The courts have already given some consideration to the problem. Moreover, these rights are at no time defini- tive, they are provisional and subject to review at any time according as changes take place in the material circumstances and conduct of the parties. Until 1952 it was not thought that the wife's right was other than a personal right against her husband which she could not enforce against a third party.
The monastic chronicler who wrote up the entry classifying the invasion seems to have got his dates wrong, the New Latin word Suthsexia was used for Sussex by Dutch cartographer Joan Blaeu in his 1645 map. Action for recovery of land under part 55 of the Civil Procedures Rules. The distinction was well pointed out by Upjohn J. But how is that to be worked out, as it must be, whenever proceedings are brought by the purchaser against the wife for possession? That can not properly be said to be actual occupation. To create a right over the land of another that right must apart from staute create a burden on the land, i.
He cannot exclude her from the house without good cause. Looking upon her as an occupant of the home she has no right to exclusive occupancy as against her husband and her own right may be determined by her own conduct or by the offer of suitable alternative accommodation see 5 Hill v. Constructive trusts, however, are usually argued to arise to perfect consent based obligations, to provide a proprietary remedy for wrongdoing, to reverse , and to reflect the contributions of work that people make, especially in family homes. A sub-underlessee in occupation of part could enforce an option to purchase against the freeholder acquiring intermediate registered. For there are two cases where the licensee was not in actual occupation and the licence was held not to bind successors.
All that she has is a licence. He quoted with approval a paragraph from the report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce Command 1956 9678 para. The first case on this point was , when an owner of land granted a man a licence to put a stack of hay on his land until he the licensee could conveniently sell it. Thus, potentially the obligation to provide a roof over the head of the other party is sufficient. Evaluation and Consequences The judge was implying in this case that there was no means for banks of identifying whether someone has an overriding interest in a property or not. The father made a contract, which could not be revoked once they began performance.